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熱門(mén)關(guān)鍵詞： 光伏太陽(yáng)能板天窗 防水光伏太陽(yáng)能電池板 U玻璃光伏太陽(yáng)能電池板
作為半導(dǎo)體的分支
那么結(jié)論不難推定
As a branch of semiconductor, the photovoltaic industry also shows specialization and integration of the two roads.From the perspective of direction, the PV industry from the upstream to the downstream of the industrial chain has a considerable degree of difference, the required core capabilities are not the same. In addition, because the technological update of silicon wafers, batteries, modules and other links has not stopped, the risk of the whole industrial chain will be much higher than that of specialized manufacturers focusing on a certain link. Therefore, in the future, the photovoltaic industry is likely to take the path of semiconductor specialization.In addition, the integration path is divided into two paths: one is from components to silicon wafers represented by Jinko, and the other is from silicon wafers to components represented by Longi.From the perspective of capacity distribution, Jinko will start with a pyramid-shaped structure with larger components and smaller wafers;Long groups show an inverted pyramid distribution in which the wafer is larger than the component. The difference between the two paths is that Jinko reduces the supply of suppliers by building silicon wafers and batteries by itself. The logic is to build upstream production capacity according to the capacity and sales of components. Relatively speaking, the whole cycle is ultimately "production based on sales", and the shipment of components determines the construction of upstream production capacity.Because the end customer is in hand, the whole chain is exported, and it is not easy to accumulate inventory.Longi, on the other hand, is the biggest producer of silicon wafers. Production minus exports determines the capacity of its own cells and modules.
However, with the expansion of module and battery capacity, Longi is increasingly threatening the market share of downstream customers, which is facing the problem that purchasing Longi's silicon wafers is providing Longi with bullets to compete with them on the battery and module side. This is not obvious in the period of shortage of monocrystal silicon, once the demand is depressed or oversupply, customers will not give priority to purchase Longi's products and will not support the 166 standard promoted by Longi "that is, will not enter your system, will only buy market standard products".
As a result, Longe will have to continue to expand its battery module capacity to absorb its unsaleable silicon wafer capacity, which will exacerbate the contradictions. The big problem with this cycle is that Longi's component capacity is built not by selling capacity, but by the redundancy of the wafer.This has resulted in large inventories when the market is depressed, as has been evident in the 531 and recent market performance. The reason is that, as stated by David, the sales of components require years of accumulation of the company's brand and the tough competition from one city to another in terms of channels, so it is impossible to keep up with the huge expansion of production capacity. That is to say, it is unrealistic to "set sales by production".
It's not hard to conclude, then, that sales can't keep up with production capacity, which will create a huge inventory barrier lake. Combined with a year of technological change in the industry, Longi has become an established rather than a disruptive player in this process. So, is it possible that Longi is a giant about to explode, squeezed by both high inventory and backward technology?
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