受傷者

愛旭股份并非完美受害者。

下游都為硅料漲價叫苦。但愛旭股份之所以在漲價后業(yè)績難看，也是為其擴張?zhí)みM買單。

愛旭2020年到2021年公布了超過80GW的新項目，投資超過400億元。上游材料價格上漲，對愛旭這樣擴張中的公司自然傷害加倍。

愛旭承受的主要是上游硅料、硅片企業(yè)壓力，而更受沖擊的是處于愛旭股份下游的組件廠商。

這些廠商長期處于兩頭擠壓中。承擔材料漲價同時，要承受國家發(fā)電平價上網(wǎng)政策約束，在整個產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈中向來毛利偏低。

組件廠可以分為三類，自己既做硅片、也做組件的龍頭，如隆基、晶科能源 ，組件業(yè)務(wù)為主，硅料、硅片業(yè)務(wù)還未成規(guī)模的大公司，如東方日升、天合光能 ，以及眾多只有組件業(yè)務(wù)的中小規(guī)模廠商。

隆基、晶科能源等并沒有傷筋動骨，他們早已鎖定了硅料長單，自己也會調(diào)高硅片價格，對沖組件部分業(yè)務(wù)的風險。

東方日升、天合光能這樣的公司雖然毛利會因此降低，但因為可以賣系統(tǒng)，也有電站業(yè)務(wù)，客源相對穩(wěn)定，其實排產(chǎn)并沒有太大變化。

真正遭殃的是中小組件廠及下游零散電站集成商。他們不可能有能力和資金提前鎖定上游硅片，只能被動迎接沖擊?！跋掠魏芡纯唷！币晃浑娬炯缮谈嬖V36氪，他們只能想辦法轉(zhuǎn)型做BIPV、光儲一體機?；蛘吒纱唷傲塘恕?。

這其實是個危險的信號。愛旭股份預料的雪崩雖然沒有在去年發(fā)生，但并不意味著今年危機不會出現(xiàn)。

硅料擴產(chǎn)在2021年還沒有完成，因此的確去年有很大的供應(yīng)問題。但今年三四季度，硅料產(chǎn)能充裕，中小廠商紛紛停工、減產(chǎn)，硅料會出現(xiàn)過剩的風險。愛旭股份陳剛略顯夸張的說法今年可能會成為現(xiàn)實?！罢麄€行業(yè)都會出現(xiàn)劇烈的雪崩。”

產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈的確處于混亂中。愛旭2021年提到商務(wù)活動無法進行，剛談完的生意還沒執(zhí)行又要根據(jù)新價格重談，之前的合同成為廢紙。在漲價一年后，今年7月，證券日報采訪光伏電站開發(fā)企業(yè)時，這一現(xiàn)象還在繼續(xù)發(fā)生。硅料價格上漲，組件供應(yīng)端頻繁違約、毀約。

很多人其實記得十多年前那次硅料漲價到暴跌的驚心。因為歐美光伏行業(yè)紅火，硅料從2006年27美元/公斤一度漲到500美元/公斤。2008年，金融危機襲來，光伏補貼取消，需求暴跌，硅料價格一瀉千里，曾經(jīng)在高峰期瘋狂擴張、鎖單的無錫尚德破產(chǎn)。

當然，目前我國硅料已經(jīng)國產(chǎn)化，不需要從海外進口，受國外價格波動小。加之政策紅利，無論國內(nèi)還是國外光伏行業(yè)都在黃金期，能消化足夠多的產(chǎn)能。這一次硅料上漲后，不會重復過去的一地雞毛。

可仍然不能忽視不安因素，歐美經(jīng)濟再次出現(xiàn)衰退跡象，2021年我國內(nèi)光伏建設(shè)其實并沒有達到市場預期，2022年疫情反復又增加不確定性。需求仍不明確，第四季度硅料產(chǎn)能完全釋放后，市場或許會遭遇激烈動蕩。 

The whole industrial chain is at a delicate moment. The profits of the upstream silicon material manufacturers soared, and the downstream complained. On July 1, the shutdown schedule of a group of mainstream photovoltaic module manufacturers spread on the Internet, including large companies such as Longji and Jingao.

Although the company quickly refuted the rumors, it is undeniable that downstream manufacturers are suffering.

Upstream is another picture. On the evening of July 4, Tongwei, a leading silicon material company, disclosed a semi annual performance forecast. It is expected that the net profit attributable to the parent company in the first half of 2022 will reach 12 billion yuan to 12.5 billion yuan, an increase of more than three times year-on-year. Tongwei's share price hit a new high on July 5, and the market value of the company exceeded 300billion yuan.

The "four heavenly kings of silicon materials", including Tongwei, have given good financial results thanks to the rising price of silicon materials and strong demand. The gross profit of GCL poly reached a record of 7.3 billion yuan in 2021. The net profit attributable to the parent company of new energy in 2021 increased by six times, and the net profit attributable to the parent company of Daquan energy in the first quarter of this year also increased by more than six times.

However, dividends belong to only a small number of upstream and leading companies.

The "Four Heavenly Kings" have made soft money, but companies in the downstream component and power station industries have been squeezed more seriously. The latter was originally in the white hot competition, and the rising price of silicon material made it difficult for downstream components and battery manufacturers to support.

Silicon material has risen from 60000 yuan / ton at the beginning of 2021 to 290000 yuan / ton now, and there is no sign of price reduction. Of course, the price rise of silicon material is largely due to the increase in installed capacity under the "double carbon" policy, coupled with the current expansion of production has not been in place, and the imbalance between supply and demand. However, this year, there have also been doubts about upstream hoarding.

If prices remain high, small and medium-sized component manufacturers will either transform, close down, or bleed to make a living. In this wave of price increases, they had to accept a big purge. Of course, there is still some distance between this and avalanche. After the dust settles, the industry may be left with a group of better companies or a recession.

some goods in short supply , hoarded or cornered for making excess or enormous profit

The price of silicon material has risen for a year and a half. The reason behind this is that the participants in different links of the industrial chain disagree.

As early as June 10, 2021, a non-public material of aixu Co., Ltd., a large downstream photovoltaic cell manufacturer, was circulated. In this report on the Symposium on hot and difficult issues in the photovoltaic industry, aixu Co., Ltd. believes that the current silicon supply has reached 190gw, but this year the global terminal demand is difficult to reach 180 GW, and there is no problem of capacity mismatch. They believe that the reason why silicon materials remain high is that "some enterprises can create the illusion of a serious shortage of polysilicon and silicon chips, which will help intermediate traders and all links of the industrial chain hoard and drive up prices."

They named one of the "some enterprises", that is, Tongwei group. Aixu described in detail that Tongwei believed that the "monthly pricing" rose too slowly and took out a small amount of silicon material to invite enterprises to bid every week. Polysilicon prices refreshed on Monday and rose 37.2% in a month. All their production activities can only be suspended.

If it is true that as mentioned by aixu, Tongwei is waiting for the price to be sold. In fact, the silicon material idles in the upstream and rises in price, but it is not invested in the downstream.

On the day after aixu submitted the materials, the photovoltaic industry association that held the symposium also issued an appeal, calling on practitioners to resist excessive hoarding, bid up prices and speculation.

Tongwei shares quickly responded, saying that it "did not ship to any intermediate traders, nor did it bid up prices and hoard strange things." As for the price, it is determined by the relationship between supply and demand.

If we only look at theoretical data, there is indeed no shortage of supply this year. According to the prediction of PV InfoLink, an industry consulting company, the global demand for components will reach at least 223gw this year. Generally, 10000 tons of polysilicon can produce 3.5gw-4gw components, so 550000-63000 tons of polysilicon are required.

In 2021, the global polysilicon output was 642000 tons. Generally, the market supply-demand ratio is greater than 1.2, which is the balance of supply and demand, so there is a sharp rise in prices in the end. If the output of this year is the same as that of last year, there will indeed be a big gap.

Since last year, the production lines of four leading silicon material plants have been put into operation, including poly GCL 20000 ton granular silicon project, Daquan energy 35000 ton polysilicon project, Tongwei 101000 ton capacity ramp up. This has brought nearly 800000 tons of silicon. Asian silicon and Oriental hope to invest new production capacity in succession this year.

However, it needs to be considered that it will take half a year for the new production line to ramp up from production, and the capacity may not be fully released until the third and fourth quarters. Coupled with the repeated epidemic, logistics also affects the arrival volume. Indeed, there will be a shortage in the first and second quarters of this year.

Under this delicate balance, it is difficult to find a clear culprit. The shortage of supply objectively exists, but the price rises so fast, which is more or less driven by the growing panic. After aixu, no more companies came forward to accuse Tongwei and other silicon material manufacturers, but they were in the center of the vortex and naturally became the biggest target.

Injured person

Aixu shares is not a perfect victim.

Downstream are all complaining about the rising price of silicon materials. However, the reason why aixu's performance is poor after the price rise is also to pay for its aggressive expansion.

Aixu announced more than 80gw of new projects from 2020 to 2021, with an investment of more than 40billion yuan. The rise in the price of upstream materials will double the natural damage to companies like aixu, which is expanding.

Aixu is mainly under the pressure of upstream silicon materials and silicon wafer enterprises, and the component manufacturers downstream of aixu shares are more affected.

These manufacturers have been squeezed at both ends for a long time. While undertaking the price rise of materials, we should bear the constraints of the national power generation parity online policy, and the gross profit has always been low in the whole industrial chain.

Component factories can be divided into three categories. They are not only the leaders of silicon chips, but also the leaders of components, such as Longji and Jinke energy. They are large companies whose component business is mainly, and whose silicon material and silicon chip business has not yet become a scale, such as Dongfang Risheng, Trinasolar, and many small and medium-sized manufacturers who only have component business.

Longji, Jinke energy and others have not hurt their muscles and bones. They have already locked in the long list of silicon materials, and they will also raise the price of silicon wafers to hedge the risks of some component businesses.

Although the gross profit of companies such as Dongfang Risheng and Trinasolar will be reduced, because they can sell systems and have power station business, the source of customers is relatively stable. In fact, the production scheduling has not changed much.

The real victims are small and medium-sized component factories and downstream scattered power station integrators. They cannot have the ability and funds to lock in the upstream silicon chip in advance, and can only passively meet the impact. "Downstream is painful." A power station integrator told 36 krypton that they could only find ways to transform into BIPV and optical storage all-in-one machine. Or simply "put it down".

This is actually a dangerous signal. Although the avalanche expected by aixu shares did not happen last year, it does not mean that this year's crisis will not occur.

The expansion of silicon production has not been completed in 2021, so there was indeed a big supply problem last year. However, in the third and fourth quarters of this year, silicon material production capacity is abundant, and small and medium-sized manufacturers have shut down and reduced production, which will lead to the risk of excess silicon material. AI Xu shares Chen Gang's slightly exaggerated statement may become a reality this year. "There will be a violent avalanche in the whole industry."

The industrial chain is indeed in chaos. In 2021, aixu mentioned that business activities could not be carried out, and the newly negotiated business had not been implemented, and it had to be renegotiated according to the new price, and the previous contract had become waste paper. One year after the price rise, this phenomenon continued to occur when securities daily interviewed photovoltaic power station development enterprises in July this year. The price of silicon material has risen, and the component supplier has frequently defaulted and broken the contract.

Many people actually remember the shock of the sharp fall in the price of silicon more than a decade ago. Due to the booming photovoltaic industry in Europe and the United States, silicon materials once rose from $27 / kg in 2006 to $500 / kg. In 2008, when the financial crisis hit, photovoltaic subsidies were canceled, demand plummeted, and the price of silicon fell sharply. Wuxi Suntech, which once expanded wildly and locked orders at the peak, went bankrupt.

Of course, at present, China's silicon materials have been localized and do not need to be imported from abroad, which is subject to small fluctuations in foreign prices. In addition to policy dividends, both domestic and foreign photovoltaic industries are in the golden period and can absorb enough capacity. After the silicon material rises this time, it will not repeat the chicken feathers of the past.

However, disturbing factors cannot be ignored. The European and American economies show signs of recession again. In fact, China's domestic photovoltaic construction in 2021 did not meet market expectations, and the epidemic situation in 2022 repeatedly increased uncertainty. The demand is still unclear. After the silicon material capacity is fully released in the fourth quarter, the market may encounter fierce turbulence.